Information Release in Second–Price Auctions

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dc.contributor.authorTroncoso-Valverde, Cristián
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-27T18:34:52Z
dc.date.available2015-07-27T18:34:52Z
dc.date.issued2015-04
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. I provide sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in which both sellers release all available information. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, the existence of this equilibrium holds true even if there are only two bidders in the market. Thus, the findings of this paper provides support to the idea that competition among sellers improves informational efficiency relatively to monopolyes_CL
dc.format.extent45 pageses_CL
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11447/105
dc.language.isoen_USes_CL
dc.publisherSchool of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrolloes_CL
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Paper;15
dc.subjectCompeting Auctionses_CL
dc.subjectInformation Structureses_CL
dc.subjectPrivate Provision of Informationes_CL
dc.titleInformation Release in Second–Price Auctionses_CL
dc.typeDocumento de trabajoes_CL

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