Information Release in Second–Price Auctions
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School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo
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45 pages
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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. I provide sufficient conditions that ensure ...
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