Information and sustaining mechanisms in Fodor's theory of content
Date
2016
Type:
Artículo
item.page.extent
14
item.page.accessRights
Authors
item.contributor.advisor
ORCID:
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Instituto de Estudios Humanisticos Juan Ignacio Molina
item.page.isbn
item.page.issn
item.page.issne
item.page.doiurl
item.page.other
item.page.references
Abstract
According to Fodor's informational approach, mental symbols have content by virtue of standing in certain nomic relations with their referents. These relations are sustained by computational mechanisms which enable the causal route linking mental symbols with the world. Fodor claims, however, that specifying the structure of those sustaining mechanisms is irrelevant for a theory of content. This paper argues that, on the contrary, without an account of the computational constraints under which those mechanisms operate, Fodor's theory is at best incomplete, and incapable of explaining what makes us the only known computing machine capable of bearing mental symbols so far.
Description
item.page.coverage.spatial
item.page.sponsorship
Citation
Universum [online]. 2016, vol.31, n.2, pp.17-30
Keywords
Informational approach to content, computational theory of mind, mental symbols, reference, asymmetric dependence theory