Information and sustaining mechanisms in Fodor's theory of content

dc.contributor.author	Aguilera, Bernardo
dc.date.accessioned	2017-08-16T12:46:46Z
dc.date.available	2017-08-16T12:46:46Z
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.description.abstract	According to Fodor's informational approach, mental symbols have content by virtue of standing in certain nomic relations with their referents. These relations are sustained by computational mechanisms which enable the causal route linking mental symbols with the world. Fodor claims, however, that specifying the structure of those sustaining mechanisms is irrelevant for a theory of content. This paper argues that, on the contrary, without an account of the computational constraints under which those mechanisms operate, Fodor's theory is at best incomplete, and incapable of explaining what makes us the only known computing machine capable of bearing mental symbols so far.
dc.format.extent	14
dc.identifier.citation	Universum [online]. 2016, vol.31, n.2, pp.17-30
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11447/1576
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.4067/S0718-23762016000200002
dc.language.iso	spa
dc.publisher	Instituto de Estudios Humanisticos Juan Ignacio Molina
dc.subject	Informational approach to content
dc.subject	computational theory of mind
dc.subject	mental symbols
dc.subject	reference
dc.subject	asymmetric dependence theory
dc.title	Information and sustaining mechanisms in Fodor's theory of content
dc.title.alternative	Información y mecanismos de sustentación en la teoría fodoriana del contenido
dc.type	Artículo

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