Information Release in Second–Price Auctions
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Date
2015-04
Type:
Documento de trabajo
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45 pages
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Publisher
School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo
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Abstract
This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. I provide sufficient conditions that ensure the existence of a unique equilibrium in which both sellers release all available information. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, the existence of this equilibrium holds true even if there are only two bidders in the market. Thus, the findings of this paper provides support to the idea that competition among sellers improves informational efficiency relatively to monopoly
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Keywords
Competing Auctions, Information Structures, Private Provision of Information