Meet-the-competition clauses and the strategic disclosure of product quality

dc.contributor.author	Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
dc.date.accessioned	2017-11-15T20:34:29Z
dc.date.available	2017-11-15T20:34:29Z
dc.date.issued	2016
dc.description.abstract	I examine the implications of meet-the-competition clauses (MCCs) for the strategic disclosure of product quality in a duopoly in which sellers can adopt these clauses before setting their prices. I show that MCCs generate incentives for the disclosure of product quality because these clauses facilitate monopoly pricing in states of nature in which the quality of products is the same. This suggests that MCCs may encourage the disclosure of information because sellers can use them to coordinate their pricing decisions based on the information revealed through disclosure.
dc.identifier.citation	B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 16, n° 4
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11447/1743
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0140
dc.language.iso	en_US
dc.subject	Meet-the-competition clauses
dc.subject	Disclosure
dc.subject	Competition
dc.title	Meet-the-competition clauses and the strategic disclosure of product quality
dc.type	Artículo

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