Signaling Quality in the Presence of Observational Learning
Authors
item.contributor.advisor
ORCID:
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
item.page.isbn
item.page.issn
item.page.issne
item.page.doiurl
item.page.extent
20 p.
item.page.accessRights
item.page.other
item.page.references
Abstract
We study the optimal pricing strategy for a privately informed monopolist in the presence of observational learning. Early adopters learn quality before purchasing the product. Late adopters learn qua...
Description
item.page.coverage.spatial
item.page.sponsorship
Citation
Review of Industrial Organization 56, 515–534 (2020)
Keywords
item.page.dc.rights
item.page.dc.rights.url
Estadísticas de uso
1 0,8 0,5 0,3 0
Agosto 2025Septiembre 2025Octubre 2025Noviembre 2025Diciembre 2025Enero 2026Febrero 2026