Experimental classification and computational simulation of strategic heterogeneity in common-pool resource social dilemmas

Simple item page
dc.contributor.advisorRodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
dc.contributor.authorHidalgo Garrido, Carlos Andrés
dc.coverage.spatialSantiago
dc.date.accessioned2025-02-24T15:38:39Z
dc.date.available2025-02-24T15:38:39Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.descriptionTesis presentada a la Facultad de Gobierno de la Universidad del Desarrollo para optar al título de Doctor en Ciencias de la Complejidad Social
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates the role of strategic heterogeneity in the governance of Common-Pool Resources (CPRs), particularly in the context of co-management policies. While effective in preventing the tragedy of the commons, co-management outcomes vary across communities. We propose that differences in co-management performance can be attributed to the heterogeneity of strategic types within user groups and how these distributions shift in response to external enforcement. To explore this, we conducted a repeated CPR game experiment with small-scale fishing communities in Chile, categorized by their real-life experience with co-management (ranging from no experience to high and lower performance). The classification was based on both secondary and primary data, which combined biological, economic, and organizational indicators. Participants were subjected to two treatments: one without norm enforcement and one with non-deterrent external enforcement. We classified their cooperative strategies as free-riders, conditional cooperators, unconditional cooperators, or negative cooperators and analyzed the distribution across user groups. Our findings demonstrate a strong association between strategic heterogeneity and co- management outcomes, highlighting the influence of co-management institutions on shaping cooperative dynamics. Additionally, we used these experimentally informed results to develop an agent-based model that simulates how varying proportions of each strategic behavior affect the stability or erosion of cooperation in social dilemmas. This research underscores the significance of considering strategic heterogeneity and incentive structures in designing effective comanagement interventions, offering deeper insights into the behavioral mechanisms that drive cooperation in CPR management.
dc.format.extent129 p.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/1052611/11447/9833
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11447/9833
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversidad del Desarrollo. Facultad de Gobierno
dc.subjectCommon-pool resources
dc.subjectSocial dilemmas
dc.subjectSmall-scale fisheries
dc.subjectExperimental game theory
dc.subjectAgent-based modelling
dc.titleExperimental classification and computational simulation of strategic heterogeneity in common-pool resource social dilemmas
dc.typeThesis
dcterms.accessRightsAcceso abierto

Files

Original bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Thumbnail Image
Name:
Experimental classification and computational simulation of strategic heterogeneity in common-pool resource social dilemmas.pdf
Size:
2.26 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format
Download
License bundle
Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
license.txt
Size:
347 B
Format:
Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
Description:
Download

Collections

Tesis Doctorales

Implementado por OpenGeek Services