Experimental classification and computational simulation of strategic heterogeneity in common-pool resource social dilemmas
Date
2024
Type:
Thesis
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129 p.
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Acceso abierto
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Publisher
Universidad del Desarrollo. Facultad de Gobierno
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Abstract
This study investigates the role of strategic heterogeneity in the governance of Common-Pool Resources (CPRs), particularly in the context of co-management policies. While effective in preventing the tragedy of the commons, co-management outcomes vary across communities. We propose that differences
in co-management performance can be attributed to the heterogeneity of strategic types within user groups and how these distributions shift in response to external enforcement. To explore this, we conducted a repeated CPR game experiment with small-scale fishing communities in Chile, categorized by their real-life experience with co-management (ranging from no experience to high and lower performance). The classification was based on both secondary and primary data, which combined biological, economic, and organizational indicators. Participants were subjected to two treatments: one without norm enforcement and one with non-deterrent external enforcement. We classified their cooperative strategies as free-riders, conditional cooperators, unconditional cooperators, or negative cooperators and analyzed the distribution across user groups. Our findings demonstrate a strong association between strategic heterogeneity and co-
management outcomes, highlighting the influence of co-management institutions on shaping cooperative dynamics. Additionally, we used these experimentally
informed results to develop an agent-based model that simulates how varying proportions of each strategic behavior affect the stability or erosion of cooperation in social dilemmas. This research underscores the significance of considering strategic heterogeneity and incentive structures in designing effective comanagement interventions, offering deeper insights into the behavioral mechanisms that drive cooperation in CPR management.
Description
Tesis presentada a la Facultad de Gobierno de la Universidad del Desarrollo para optar al título de Doctor en Ciencias de la Complejidad Social
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Santiago
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Citation
Keywords
Common-pool resources, Social dilemmas, Small-scale fisheries, Experimental game theory, Agent-based modelling