Person:
Fossa, Pablo

Loading...
Profile Picture

Email Address

Birth Date

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Job Title

Last Name

Fossa

First Name

Pablo

Name

¿Qué estás buscando?



Search Results

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
  • Publication
    Why Theory of Mind Is Not Enough to Understand Others?
    (2023) Sanhueza, María Isabel; Fossa, Pablo
    Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit one’s own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of one’s own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, subdimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding one’s own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.
  • Publication
    The Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice: An Answer to Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and Machková (2023)
    (2023) Fossa, Pablo
    This article reflects on the analyzes and comments of Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and Machková (2023) on the book New Perspectives on Inner Speech (Fossa, 2022a). First, I focus on responding and expanding the ideas presented by the authors, to later integrate the elements highlighted by them. By integrating the reflections and comments of the authors, it is evident that in inner speech there is an intersection between two continua. On the one hand, the control-lack of control continuum and, on the other hand, the diffuse-clear continuum. The level of clarity and control varies permanently during each act of internal speech, accounting for a phenomenon that advances from infinite interiority to infinite exteriority, and vice versa. This complex interaction of two continua – based on the level of control and the level of sharpness – defies empirical applications and demands methodological innovation in research centers interested in the Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice
  • Publication
    The inexhaustible experience of the inner voice: an answer to Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and Machková (2023)
    (2023) Fossa, Pablo
    This article reflects on the analyzes and comments of Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and Machková (2023) on the book New Perspectives on Inner Speech (Fossa, 2022a). First, I focus on responding and expanding the ideas presented by the authors, to later integrate the elements highlighted by them. By integrating the reflections and comments of the authors, it is evident that in inner speech there is an intersection between two continua. On the one hand, the control-lack of control continuum and, on the other hand, the diffuse-clear continuum. The level of clarity and control varies permanently during each act of internal speech, accounting for a phenomenon that advances from infinite interiority to infinite exteriority, and vice versa. This complex interaction of two continua - based on the level of control and the level of sharpness - defies empirical applications and demands methodological innovation in research centers interested in the Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice.
  • Publication
    Cuatro aproximaciones a la experiencia subjetiva desde la metodología de investigación fenomenológica hermenéutica
    (2022) Pacheco Pacheco, Cristóbal; Fossa, Pablo
    En el presente artículo se realizó una aproximación a los planteamientos centrales a la metodología fenomenológica hermenéutica, como modo de acercamiento a la vivencia subjetiva particular. Es sobre la base de los planteamientos de filósofos tales como Husserl (2012), Heidegger (2020) y Merleau-Ponty (1945), que han urgido posibilidades de acercamiento a la construcción propia de la realidad a nivel particular, lo cual reviste un interesante campo de estudio. Este estudio realiza una revisión sistemática de cuatro formas de aproximación a la experiencia particular desde una dimensión fenomenológica y hermenéutica. Las metodologías consideradas son las siguientes: el paradigma de las ciencias humanas para el estudio fenomenológico de Max Van Manen (1990); el método descriptivo fenomenológico en psicología de Amedeo Giorgi (1986, 2009); la entrevista microfenomenológica de Claire Petitmengin (2006) y el Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) de Jonathan Smith y Mike Osborn (2003). Como conclusiones del presente estudio, se visualiza la necesidad de lograr una mayor estructuración metodológica que respete, a la vez, la tradición de un acercamiento desprejuiciado al estudio de los fenómenos, propios de la fenomenología y hermenéutica.
  • Publication
    Why theory of mind Is not enough to understand others?
    (2023) Sanhueza, María Isabel; Fossa, Pablo
    Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit one’s own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of one’s own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, subdimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding one’s own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.