Tesis Doctorales
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Browsing Tesis Doctorales by Subject "Common-pool resources"
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Item Experimental classification and computational simulation of strategic heterogeneity in common-pool resource social dilemmas(Universidad del Desarrollo. Facultad de Gobierno, 2024) Hidalgo Garrido, Carlos Andrés; Rodríguez-Sickert, CarlosThis study investigates the role of strategic heterogeneity in the governance of Common-Pool Resources (CPRs), particularly in the context of co-management policies. While effective in preventing the tragedy of the commons, co-management outcomes vary across communities. We propose that differences in co-management performance can be attributed to the heterogeneity of strategic types within user groups and how these distributions shift in response to external enforcement. To explore this, we conducted a repeated CPR game experiment with small-scale fishing communities in Chile, categorized by their real-life experience with co-management (ranging from no experience to high and lower performance). The classification was based on both secondary and primary data, which combined biological, economic, and organizational indicators. Participants were subjected to two treatments: one without norm enforcement and one with non-deterrent external enforcement. We classified their cooperative strategies as free-riders, conditional cooperators, unconditional cooperators, or negative cooperators and analyzed the distribution across user groups. Our findings demonstrate a strong association between strategic heterogeneity and co- management outcomes, highlighting the influence of co-management institutions on shaping cooperative dynamics. Additionally, we used these experimentally informed results to develop an agent-based model that simulates how varying proportions of each strategic behavior affect the stability or erosion of cooperation in social dilemmas. This research underscores the significance of considering strategic heterogeneity and incentive structures in designing effective comanagement interventions, offering deeper insights into the behavioral mechanisms that drive cooperation in CPR management.Item The Behavioral Foundations of Rule Compliance under Resource Scarcity: An Experimental Approach to Common-Pool Resource Governance(Universidad del Desarrollo. Facultad de Gobierno, 2026) Molina Monje, Alejandra Isabel; Rivera Salazar, DiegoScarcity is a central feature of many common pool resource (CPR) systems, yet little is known about how its different forms influence individuals’ willingness to follow collective rules. This thesis examines the behavioral mechanisms that sustain compliance under resource stress, combining controlled laboratory experiments with a field experiment conducted with members of Water User Associations in central Chile. By conceptualizing scarcity as unmet demand, the thesis distinguishes among exogenous scarcity arising from external constraints, endogenous scarcity resulting from others’ overuse, and collective scarcity based on information about system-wide shortfalls. The laboratory study identifies distinct mechanisms for each type of scarcity. Exogenous scarcity reduces compliance by narrowing cognitive focus, while endogenous scarcity activates negative reciprocity that increases rule violations. These processes show how scarcity alters perceptions of fairness, expectations about others’ behavior, and the cognitive foundations of cooperation. The field experiment evaluates whether these mechanisms also operate in real water governance contexts. The results mirror the laboratory findings and show that institutional experience moderates some responses. Water User Association members are more sensitive to collective scarcity cues, reflecting the role of lived experience and social learning. A methodology is also proposed to incorporate these behavioral mechanisms into sociohydrological models. These studies show that scarcity influences behavior in CPR systems in ways that are empirically grounded and highly relevant for environmental governance and socio-hydrology. The findings indicate that compliance depends not only on incentives or enforcement but also on psychological and social responses that evolve over time. Integrating these dynamics into sociohydrological models will improve resilience predictions and support the design of more adaptive water governance institutions under climatic uncertainty.