Voluntary disclosure of product quality in competitive markets

dc.contributor.author	Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián
dc.date.accessioned	2016-07-12T16:55:41Z
dc.date.available	2016-07-12T16:55:41Z
dc.date.issued	2016-06
dc.description.abstract	This note examines the incentives to communicate private information about product quality in markets in which sellers can voluntarily disclose this information before competing on prices. We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of two types of symmetric equilibria, one in which every type of seller fully discloses the quality of its product and one in which no such disclosures are made. We then show that if the disclosure cost is not too high the full disclosure equilibrium Pareto-dominates the full non-disclosure one, suggesting that competition may increase rather than reduce incentives to reveal information through disclosure	es_CL
dc.format.extent	9 pages	es_CL
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11447/681
dc.language.iso	en_US	es_CL
dc.publisher	School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo	es_CL
dc.relation.ispartofseries	Working Paper;33
dc.subject	Disclosure	es_CL
dc.subject	Quality	es_CL
dc.subject	Signaling	es_CL
dc.subject	Competition	es_CL
dc.title	Voluntary disclosure of product quality in competitive markets	es_CL
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	es_CL

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