Person: Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos
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Rodriguez-Sickert
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Carlos
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Publication The effect of intergroup competition outcome on ingroup cooperation: insights from the male warrior hypothesis(2024) Belinchón, Montserrat; Polo Rodrigo, Pablo; Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos; Figueroa, Oriana; Valenzuela-Martinez, Nohelia T.; Pavez, Paula; Muñoz Reyes, José AntonioIntroduction: The Male Warrior Hypothesis (MWH) proposes that sex-specific elective pressures have promoted male cooperation with the ingroup members to outcompete rival groups. However, intergroup conflicts do not occur in isolation and the outcomes of previous competitions may influence group cooperativeness. Since this phenomenon is not well understood, we aimed to shed light on the effect of previous competition outcome on later cooperative behavior under intergroup conflicts. Based on the MWH, we hypothesized that repeated contests between groups could enhance ingroup cooperation, regardless of the outcome of the previous contest because status is at risk, but when competition is not present, participants would move to the symmetric equilibria. Methods: To test this hypothesis, we recruited 246 individuals organized in groups of 6 and measured cooperation using a threshold public good game over two rounds, manipulating the outcome in the first round to create groups of winners and losers. Results: Our results show that intergroup conflict scenarios promoted cooperation in both victory and defeat conditions, whereas, in the control scenario only losers increased their cooperation. Discussion: We argue that winners under the presence of an external threat may enhance in-group cooperation in order to assure their status; whereas, losers may be attempting to regain it.Publication Evidence of the active participation of women in the intergroup conflict based on the use of aggression and cooperation(2023) Muñoz Reyes, José Antonio; Torrico-Bazoberry, Daniel; Polo Rodrigo, Pablo; Figueroa, Oriana; Guzmán-Lavín, Eugenio; Fajardo, Gabriela; Valenzuela-Martinez, Nohelia T.; Belinchón, Montserrat; Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos; Pita, MiguelIntergroup conflict has been a persistent aspect of human societies since the emergence of our species. Various researchers have proposed that competition between groups has acted as a key selective force throughout human evolutionary history. Such intergroup competition for limited resources exacerbated the expression of intergroup aggression and intragroup cooperation. Furthermore, it would have a sexual dimorphism, with men demonstrating increased sensitivity to conflict threats—in order to maximize reproductive opportunities—, while women generally reject from active engagement in intergroup conflict. In the present study, we conducted behavioral experiments under controlled laboratory conditions to measure cooperation and aggression from using virtual games, specifically the Public Good Games and the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm, in a sample of 541 participants. We created control and experimental intergroup competition scenarios, where aggression and cooperation were necessary to increase monetary rewards. Our results shows that men modulate aggression and cooperation in the presence of intergroup conflict. In addition, our data also reveals that women cooperate more than men and display heightened levels of cooperation and aggression when confronted with intergroup conflict. These findings prompt a reevaluation of current functional theoretical models concerning the role of women in intergroup conflict and suggest that the dynamics of human aggression and cooperation may be more nuanced than previously believed.Publication Jealousy as Predicted by Allocation and Reception of Resources in an Economic Game(2024) Barbato, María Teresa; Fernández, Ana María; Rodriguez-Sickert, Carlos; Muñoz Reyes, José Antonio; Polo; Polo Rodrigo, Pablo; Buss, DavidEvidence is abundant that evolution by selection has produced sex differences in the design of adaptations to solve the problems surrounding reproduction. A prime example is the design of human jealousy, which research suggests is triggered by distinct evoking acts that are specific challenges for women and men in their exclusive reproductive bond. It follows that jealousy would be directed toward driving away interlopers who could potentially threaten the bond with the romantic partner or increase mate retention efforts in response to sex-specific threats. To explore this possibility, we use as a methodological innovation an eco nomic game for the evocation of jealousy. With a modified dictator game, we showed men and women in a committed relationship, conditions in which the partner or an intrasexual rival allocates money to (investing condition), or obtains money from (receiving condition), the partner or an opposite sex third party that they recently met. A sample of 56 heterosexual couples (n =112) participated in a laboratory setting. Our results show the different scenarios of this dictator game exerted the expected evocation of jealousy (controlling individual differences), with women being more jealous by the partner’s allocation of resources to a rival, and men reporting slightly more jealousy by their partner receiving money from a rival. We discuss the implications of this method to advance the comprehension of the adaptive function of sex differences in jealousy, the use of economic games, and possible modifications to improve the similarity of the game to a real assessment of actual male jealousy