Person: Salvaj, Erica
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Publication Reputation and Political Legitimacy: IT T in Chile, 1927-1972(School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo, 2013) Bucheli, Marcelo; Salvaj, EricaThe literature on multinational corporations argues that a foreign firm can legitimize its activities, improve its reputation in a host country, and reduce the risk of hostile actions by the host government (including expropriation) by approaching and incorporating influential members of the domestic elite in its business. By using the concept of obsolescing political legitimacy, we argue that this legitimating strategy can lead to a loss of reputation and eventual illegitimacy when the host country undergoes significant social and institutional changes. When these changes take place, the domestic society can perceive that the multinational benefited from a previous social and institutional order increasingly considered as illegitimate. Under these circumstances, the new order will question the legitimacy of the multinational's operations, increasing the risk of expropriation. We illustrate our hypothesis with the case of the political strategies of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) in Chile in the twentieth centuryPublication Adaptation Strategies of Multinational Corporations, State-Owned Enterprises, and Domestic Business Groups to Economic and Political Transitions: A Network Analysis of the Chilean Telecommunications Sector, 1958- 2005(School of Business and Economics, Universidad del Desarrollo, 2014-09) Bucheli, Marcelo; Salvaj, EricaThis paper compares the corporate network strategies between multinational corporations of two different origins (United States and Spain), business groups, and state-owned enterprises in the public utility sector of a developing country going through economic and political transitions. The transitions we consider are from an import substitution industrialization model to an open market economy and from a democratic regime to a dictatorial one and back to democracy. We analyze the Chilean telecommunications sector between 1958 and 2005 and find that during a democratic regime all firms sought to build more networks with each other, while incentives decrease under an authoritarian regime. In the protectionist era, US investors built links with Chile’s corporate elite, while in times of an open economy, Spanish investors built these links with the government. State-owned corporations did not attempt to build links with other actors at any time, and business groups sought to build most networks among members of the group. Our findings challenge two commonly held assumptions: first, that open economies decrease incentives for domestic actors to build links with each other and, second, that close political regimes increase incentives to build networks among economic actors