Person:
Paniagua, Pablo

Loading...
Profile Picture

Email Address

Birth Date

Research Projects

Organizational Units

Job Title

Last Name

Paniagua

First Name

Pablo

Name

¿Qué estás buscando?



Search Results

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    On the nature and structure of externalities
    (2023) Paniagua, Pablo; Rayamajhee, Veeshan
    This paper contributes to the literature on externalities and their classification by reconciling insights from transaction costs theory with James Buchanan’s and Elinor Ostrom’s analyses of property rights and institutional diversity. We critique the dominant Pigouvian analysis, which assumes only two forms of institutions—namely, governments and private markets—that can internalize externalities. We develop a new taxonomy of externalities that provides relevant conceptual space for a wide array of institutions that the market-versus-state dichotomy obscures. The proposed taxonomy considers two key classes of often-conflated attributes: (1) the scale of externalities, and (2) the assignability, enforceability, and tradability of property rights. This approach enriches the Coasean (transaction cost) perspective by allowing us to unbundle transaction costs in a manner that extends its applicability to nonmarket situations in which market-based transactions are either not permitted or technically infeasible. Thus, by integrating insights from two distinct Public Choice schools, we broaden the theory of externalities to not only encompass market exchanges but also to incorporate cases in which property rights are, and will remain, unclear. We conclude that institutional diversity can offer adaptable solutions to tackle medium- and large-scale externalities.
  • Publication
    James Buchanan y la elección pública: implicancias para la economía y la filosofía política
    (2023) Paniagua, Pablo
    Este ensayo analiza las tres premisas de la teoría de la elección pública a través del pensamiento del Premio Nobel James Buchanan. Primero, se exploran los tres principios orientadores de la elección pública, mediante el trabajo contractualista de Buchanan: el individualismo metodológico, la simetría del comportamiento y la política como procesos de intercambio. Posteriormente, se examina en detalle las tres principales implicancias económicas, políticas y filosóficas que se pueden derivar de dicha visión analítica. El ensayo concluye señalando que —desde el paradigma contractualista de Buchanan— se obtienen ciertos conceptos decisivos e implicancias teóricas originales que generan nuevas categorías filosóficas y políticas acerca del rol de los economistas y de un orden social pluralista, compatibles con la democracia liberal y con la asociación.