Person: Paniagua, Pablo
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Publication On the nature and structure of externalities(2023) Paniagua, Pablo; Rayamajhee, VeeshanThis paper contributes to the literature on externalities and their classification by reconciling insights from transaction costs theory with James Buchanan’s and Elinor Ostrom’s analyses of property rights and institutional diversity. We critique the dominant Pigouvian analysis, which assumes only two forms of institutions—namely, governments and private markets—that can internalize externalities. We develop a new taxonomy of externalities that provides relevant conceptual space for a wide array of institutions that the market-versus-state dichotomy obscures. The proposed taxonomy considers two key classes of often-conflated attributes: (1) the scale of externalities, and (2) the assignability, enforceability, and tradability of property rights. This approach enriches the Coasean (transaction cost) perspective by allowing us to unbundle transaction costs in a manner that extends its applicability to nonmarket situations in which market-based transactions are either not permitted or technically infeasible. Thus, by integrating insights from two distinct Public Choice schools, we broaden the theory of externalities to not only encompass market exchanges but also to incorporate cases in which property rights are, and will remain, unclear. We conclude that institutional diversity can offer adaptable solutions to tackle medium- and large-scale externalities.Publication Governing the global fisheries commons(2014) Paniagua, Pablo; Rayamajhee, VeeshanDespite significant advances in understanding the biophysical and institutional causes of overfishing, we have yet to make progress in addressing the depletion of our global fisheries stock. Investigations of potential solutions tend to be too broad (mischaracterizing global fisheries as a singular commons problem to be addressed at the supranational level) or too narrow (focusing on improving management of small fisheries at the micro level). This article attempts to bridge the gap between our scientific understanding of our collective dilemmas and their pragmatic solutions. Building on insights from Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, we frame the depletion of global fisheries as a nested set of diverse and interconnected collective action problems organized at different horizontal and vertical levels, where decisions and actions of one jurisdictional unit reinforce and amplify problems (and solutions) for other units. We examine features of the global fisheries system, such as nonstationarity, nestedness, and prohibitive transaction costs. Then, we explore some potential solutions. The success of our conservation goals depends on our ability to craft institutional rules at the lower levels that are adaptive to local conditions, address incentive misalignment issues, and allow for the transfer of positive externalities to adjacent and higher levels.Publication Complex externalities: introduction to the special issue(2024) Paniagua, Pablo; Rayamajhee, Veeshan; Murtazashvili, Iliacollection of essays extends analytical bridges between public choice, property rights economics, and new institutional economics. The essays question many of our prevailing assumptions behind the standard conceptualization of externalities. They also offer pragmatic and theoretical alternatives and apply these insights to analyze radio spectrum, environmental pollution, intellectual property, and public health issues. These essays demonstrate the ongoing significance of public choice in addressing society’s most pressing challenges