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Fossa, Pablo

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Fossa

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Pablo

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Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
  • Publication
    Why Theory of Mind Is Not Enough to Understand Others?
    (2023) Sanhueza, MarĆ­a Isabel; Fossa, Pablo
    Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit oneā€™s own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of oneā€™s own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, subdimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding oneā€™s own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.
  • Publication
    The Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice: An Answer to Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and MachkovĆ” (2023)
    (2023) Fossa, Pablo
    This article reflects on the analyzes and comments of Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and MachkovĆ” (2023) on the book New Perspectives on Inner Speech (Fossa, 2022a). First, I focus on responding and expanding the ideas presented by the authors, to later integrate the elements highlighted by them. By integrating the reflections and comments of the authors, it is evident that in inner speech there is an intersection between two continua. On the one hand, the control-lack of control continuum and, on the other hand, the diffuse-clear continuum. The level of clarity and control varies permanently during each act of internal speech, accounting for a phenomenon that advances from infinite interiority to infinite exteriority, and vice versa. This complex interaction of two continua ā€“ based on the level of control and the level of sharpness ā€“ defies empirical applications and demands methodological innovation in research centers interested in the Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice
  • Publication
    The inexhaustible experience of the inner voice: an answer to Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and MachkovĆ” (2023)
    (2023) Fossa, Pablo
    This article reflects on the analyzes and comments of Marioka (2023), Fadeev (2023) and MachkovĆ” (2023) on the book New Perspectives on Inner Speech (Fossa, 2022a). First, I focus on responding and expanding the ideas presented by the authors, to later integrate the elements highlighted by them. By integrating the reflections and comments of the authors, it is evident that in inner speech there is an intersection between two continua. On the one hand, the control-lack of control continuum and, on the other hand, the diffuse-clear continuum. The level of clarity and control varies permanently during each act of internal speech, accounting for a phenomenon that advances from infinite interiority to infinite exteriority, and vice versa. This complex interaction of two continua - based on the level of control and the level of sharpness - defies empirical applications and demands methodological innovation in research centers interested in the Inexhaustible Experience of the Inner Voice.
  • Publication
    Cuatro aproximaciones a la experiencia subjetiva desde la metodologĆ­a de investigaciĆ³n fenomenolĆ³gica hermenĆ©utica
    (2022) Pacheco Pacheco, CristĆ³bal; Fossa, Pablo
    En el presente artĆ­culo se realizĆ³ una aproximaciĆ³n a los planteamientos centrales a la metodologĆ­a fenomenolĆ³gica hermenĆ©utica, como modo de acercamiento a la vivencia subjetiva particular. Es sobre la base de los planteamientos de filĆ³sofos tales como Husserl (2012), Heidegger (2020) y Merleau-Ponty (1945), que han urgido posibilidades de acercamiento a la construcciĆ³n propia de la realidad a nivel particular, lo cual reviste un interesante campo de estudio. Este estudio realiza una revisiĆ³n sistemĆ”tica de cuatro formas de aproximaciĆ³n a la experiencia particular desde una dimensiĆ³n fenomenolĆ³gica y hermenĆ©utica. Las metodologĆ­as consideradas son las siguientes: el paradigma de las ciencias humanas para el estudio fenomenolĆ³gico de Max Van Manen (1990); el mĆ©todo descriptivo fenomenolĆ³gico en psicologĆ­a de Amedeo Giorgi (1986, 2009); la entrevista microfenomenolĆ³gica de Claire Petitmengin (2006) y el Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) de Jonathan Smith y Mike Osborn (2003). Como conclusiones del presente estudio, se visualiza la necesidad de lograr una mayor estructuraciĆ³n metodolĆ³gica que respete, a la vez, la tradiciĆ³n de un acercamiento desprejuiciado al estudio de los fenĆ³menos, propios de la fenomenologĆ­a y hermenĆ©utica.
  • Publication
    Why theory of mind Is not enough to understand others?
    (2023) Sanhueza, MarĆ­a Isabel; Fossa, Pablo
    Theory of Mind (ToM), understood as the ability to intuit oneā€™s own mental states and those of others, has been extensively researched in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. The psychological literature shows a direct relationship between ToM and the (self) reflective capacity of consciousness, a product of the cognitive effort that implies the understanding of oneā€™s own subjectivity and that of others. In this sense, ToM has received a strong cognitive influence, subdimensioning other dimensions involved in the intersubjective process of mutual understanding. Based on the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and the theory of intuition in phenomenology, we propose in this paper that the process of understanding oneā€™s own mental states and the mental states of others constitutes, mainly, a pre-reflective and intuitive experience, and that it is only possible to move on to reflection at a later time. In short, with contributions from the theory of pre-reflective consciousness and phenomenological intuition, the aim is to complement the theoretical bases of ToM in psychology; a theory that, without incorporating elements of phenomenology, remains incomplete.