



### **Understanding Informal Volunteer Behavior for Fast and Resilient Disaster Recovery: An Application of Entrepreneurial Effectuation Theory**

Journal:	<i>Disaster Prevention and Management</i>
Manuscript ID	DPM-05-2019-0151.R3
Manuscript Type:	Research Paper
Keyword:	Disaster relief, Entrepreneurship, Informal Volunteer, Effectuation, Case study, Opportunity Recognition, Disaster response and recovery, Disaster

## 1. Introduction

In most developed countries, emergency and disaster management relies largely on a workforce of professionals and volunteers affiliated with official agencies (Whittaker *et al.*, 2015) but new technologies, increased connectivity, and social media now enable ordinary citizens to participate in emergency and disaster management (McLennan *et al.*, 2015). Traditionally, their initiatives have been undervalued and viewed as a nuisance or liability (Helsloot and Ruitenbergh, 2004; Scanlon, *et al.*, 2014; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985), however, the increasing disaster risks posed worldwide by anthropogenic climate change, populations shifts (Pachauri *et al.*, 2014), population growth and urban development (Field *et al.*, 2012) create a context in which the efforts of these informal volunteers will provide much of the additional surge capacity required to respond appropriately.

In this study, we examine informal volunteerism (the activities of people who work outside of formal emergency and disaster management arrangements) through the theoretical lens of Effectuation Theory to explain informal volunteer behavior and cognition and gain insight on how they develop their disaster relief efforts and how these can serve to increase community's capacity to absorb, recover, cope, 'bounce back', mitigate, withstand or resist the impacts of hazards (Aldunce *et al.*, 2015). This is accomplished by speeding up disaster recovery, rebuilding the local economy and establishing long term solutions. The specific objectives of this research are twofold: first, to make a significant scholarly contribution by studying the informal volunteer phenomenon through the theoretical lens of Effectuation Theory; second, to provide theoretical and practical implications that can improve and assist recovery efforts so they can better serve rebuilding post-disaster societies and increase their resilience.

## 2. Effectuation Theory

Natural disasters are defined as the 'impact of an extreme natural event on an exposed, vulnerable society' (Mechler, 2003). Some authors (Cannon 1994; Weichselgartner, 2001) argue that the term "natural disaster" can be misleading as, for example, approximately 87% of the most recent natural disasters are climate-related extreme weather events (Monllor and Murphy, 2017), which has significant links with human causes. They posit that hazards are natural, but in general disasters are not, and should not be seen as the inevitable outcome of a hazard's impact (Cannon, 1994). The prevalence of climate-related extreme weather hazards calls for a shift away from managing for a relatively predictable future towards developing flexible and speedy responses to unpredictable, non-linear change (Farazmand, 2017). This context is one at which effectuation is

1  
2  
3 especially suitable (Fisher, 2012; Morrish and Jones, 2019). Individuals who adopt an effectual  
4 approach work with the means within their control, use experimentation, select alternatives based  
5 on affordable loss, and maintain flexibility by adjusting when necessary. Instead of attempting to  
6 predict the future, they seek to control it by developing partnerships and securing pre-  
7 commitments from various stakeholders (Chandler *et al.*, 2011; Dew *et al.*, 2009).  
8  
9

10  
11  
12 Effectuation posits a theoretical framework of decision making in uncertain situations (Jiang and  
13 Riling, 2019) that contrasts with the more traditional causation approach where processes take  
14 a particular effect as given and focus on selecting between means to create that effect  
15 (Sarasvathy, 2001). Effectuation emphasizes control rather than prediction and explains how new  
16 artifacts, such as products, firms, and markets, emerge rather than assuming them to be  
17 predetermined (Chandler *et al.*, 2011; Sarasvathy, 2001; Sarasvathy *et al.*, 2014). It posits that  
18 the means, resources, and capabilities one can mobilize constitute more influential determinants  
19 of action than the ends one might elect to pursue (Gregoire and Cherchem, 2017) with a planned  
20 strategy. Table 1 provides a contrast between causation and effectuation processes.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
Insert Table 1 Here

Effectuation introduces four key principles (Deligianni *et al.*, 2017; Palmie *et al.*, 2018):

- Experimentation – Entails generating new opportunities from available means and involves a degree of trial-and-error learning (McGrath, 1995). Investments in trial-and-error experiments help identify potential new solutions to problems and outcomes result in “new, discomfiting information” (Sarasvathy *et al.*, 2014) that permits individuals to abandon infertile experimental actions early (Chandler *et al.*, 2007; 2011).
- Flexibility - Relates to acknowledging unexpected events and leveraging them into unexpected contingencies. Unforeseen events are perceived as opportunities rather than threats and are leveraged (Chandler *et al.*, 2007, 2011; Dew *et al.*, 2009). Flexibility is beneficial (Vera and Crossan, 2005) because it promotes improvisation instead of selecting a single, “best” plan from the outset (Deligianni *et al.*, 2017).
- Pre-commitments – Involves the creation of avenues for stakeholder self-selection and reaching out to network means in an attempt to find partners that help and support the effort. Ideas are disclosed early to get partners to commit and collaborate (Chandler *et al.*, 2011; Sarasvathy, 2008). Pre-commitments have a direct impact on the actions taken and the opportunities chosen (Sarasvathy *et al.*, 2014).

- Affordable Loss – Comprises efforts to minimize the risks associated with overspending (Sarasvathy *et al.*, 2014) or “find(ing) ways to reach the market(s) with minimum expenditures of resources” and losses are deemed acceptable (Sarasvathy, 2001).

### 3. Informal Volunteerism

Informal volunteerism has been defined as “the activities of people who work outside of formal emergency and disaster management arrangements to help others who are at risk or are affected by emergencies and disasters” (Whittaker *et al.*, 2015) and who, in most instances, do so before formal organizations (Einolf *et al.*, 2016). Whittaker *et al.* (2015) has developed three broad informal volunteer categories: emerging, extended and digital. Emerging informal volunteers are those who collaborate to satisfy unmet needs, whether perceived or real, and features improvisation and innovation. Emerging volunteers can partake in prevention and preparedness activities; thus, it can occur prior to a disaster. When organizations and groups without prior emergency or disaster functions extend their activities in order to volunteer, they fall within the Extended category. Extended volunteers often have intimate understanding of local needs and can draw on existing networks and resources to meet them. Finally, Digital informal volunteers are made possible by the increasing accessibility to information and communication technologies. These technologies allow individuals all over the world to participate in emergency and disaster management through the production and dissemination of essential emergency-related information.

### 4. Methodology

We apply a case study approach as informal volunteerism is a novel topic of inquiry and the setting is rare and uncontrollable. Case studies are considered one of the most appropriate methods when: 1) trying to understand how a phenomenon arises and evolves, 2) there is little control over behavioral events, 3) the topic of study is contemporary by nature (Yin, 2013; Lee and Saunders, 2017) and 4) in the early phases of theory building (Gibbert *et al.*, 2008),.

To assure analytic rigor, we used an embedded multiple case design, which consists of multiple cases and multiple units of analysis (Cresswell and Miller, 2000) that are embedded in the same or a similar context. The ‘embedded multiple case’ has two main advantages: First, it allows contrasting of cases to discern the extent to which predicted patterns of behavior are observed across cases (i.e. a multiple-case design). Second, it allows observation of similarities and differences among sub-units within the same case (embedded design) (Yin, 2014). These

1  
2  
3 advantages are enhanced if the case uses multiple sources of evidence, establishes a chain of  
4 evidence, addresses rival explanations, and uses a replication logic to make comparisons among  
5 cases and units of analysis (Yin, 2014).  
6  
7

8  
9 We studied the behavior of individual volunteers (units of analysis) in the context of three disasters  
10 to compare and contrast: (1) 2017 Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, (2) 2014 Valparaiso Fire in  
11 Chile and (3) the 2010 Chile Earthquake (See Table 2).  
12  
13

14  
15  
16 Insert Table 2 Here  
17  
18

19 To build each case we developed a protocol, which included the research objectives, the  
20 theoretical framework, data collection, data analysis, and a template for case study report. We  
21 designed the case protocol so that we could establish a chain of evidence (i.e. sorting the  
22 participant's experience in chronological order), address rival explanations (i.e. using theoretical  
23 sampling to find cases with different attributes), and compare and contrast cases using a  
24 replication logic (i.e. creating a set of shared categories for case study elaboration and report)  
25 (Yin, 2014). First step was to undertake a thorough online and personal network search to identify  
26 potential individuals that demonstrated evidence of informal volunteerism. We then proceeded to  
27 analyze the data, create initial profiles of each case and parse those individuals who fit the  
28 definition of an informal volunteer (See Table 2). This selection process was guided by the  
29 assumption of a research gap concerning the development of goals and actions by informal  
30 volunteers after a disaster (Strandh & Eklund, 2018). The next step consisted of contacting these  
31 volunteers and asking them to participate in the study. To add variance and rival explanations,  
32 we also included cases of individuals that volunteered for established relief organizations. Hence,  
33 the interviewees were selected strategically (Patton, 2015) with the purpose of discussing and  
34 contrasting different types of disasters and varying volunteer types (Strandh, 2019; Whittaker *et*  
35 *al.*, 2015). An interview format was considered appropriate as our aim was to capture the  
36 volunteers' experience and perceptions. It allowed us to focus on a topic of inquiry and gain  
37 knowledge about what they perceive to be important (Yin, 2013).  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49

50 Finally, we conducted eight semi-structured interviews with the goal of eliciting discussion around  
51 participants' experience. Examples of questions included: *Did you have a previous vision with*  
52 *respect to what you wanted to accomplish?* (relates to the Experimentation Principle), *Did you*  
53 *have to change your plan at any time during your relief effort?* (Relates to the Flexibility Principle),  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 *What resources did you require during your relief effort? Where they personal resources or come*  
4 *from a third party? (relates to the Pre-Commitments and Affordable Loss Principles). All interviews*  
5 *were conducted by phone, lasted between 45 and 60 minutes, and were recorded and transcribed*  
6 *by the authors, which proceeded to divide the data into smaller units of one or a few sentences.*  
7  
8  
9

10  
11 Based on the four effectuation principles (flexibility, experimentation, pre-commitments and  
12 affordable loss) we created a codebook and two authors independently scoured the transcribed  
13 units to take note of whether any of the principles were present. The categorization of the data  
14 resulted in 91.5% agreement between both authors, who then discussed the differences until a  
15 consensus was reached. All the information was put in chronological order to make sense of the  
16 emerging process of informal volunteerism, so as to understand if, how and why effectuation  
17 principles were deployed over time. We used the constant comparative method (Corbin and  
18 Strauss, 2015; Glaser and Strauss, 2017) to assure that the categories and themes that emerged  
19 from data were consistent across cases and linked to established theoretical constructs.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

## 26 **5. Findings**

### 27 *Hurricane Maria*

28  
29  
30  
31  
32 In 2017 Puerto Rico was hit by Hurricane Maria, a category 5 hurricane. It's considered the tenth  
33 most intense Atlantic hurricane on record, causing nearly 100% of the island to lose electricity  
34 (Hincks, 2017) and indirectly causing the death of more than two thousand citizens (Robles *et al.*,  
35 2017).  
36  
37  
38  
39

40 The three volunteers interviewed for this case (See Table 2) belong to the Emerging Volunteer  
41 category (Whittaker *et al.*, 2015). All three subjects were located in the United States and  
42 relocated to Puerto Rico. Their first move was to look at the means at their disposal to guide their  
43 actions and the solutions they pursued, as per the Experimentation Principle. Ethan owner of a  
44 medical equipment company had access to a chartered plane. Based on this, he saw an  
45 opportunity to bring medical equipment, supplies and medicine to the island. Carlos had family on  
46 the island and used his own personal reserves to bring needed lanterns and batteries. Finally,  
47 Jesse had prior experience working in disaster zones and a network of war veterans, so he flew  
48 over to deliver food and water.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Upon arrival, Jesse expected to encounter a lack of food but realized that local stores had stock  
4 but were unable to sell it due to a lack of electricity and communications in a country where most  
5 people rely on government funding that is made available through an electronic debit card.  
6 Consequently, Jesse abandoned his plan and decided to develop and install a solar powered  
7 satellite communications system that would allow these transactions to take place. This fluidity  
8 and responsiveness is an essential component of the Experimentation Principle. Volunteers grope  
9 along (Dimov, 2010) and generate new information that helps them iterate and discover new  
10 opportunities (Arend *et al.*, 2015). As Jesse states “*We piloted it, tested it, showed it worked and*  
11 *scaled the project ... in a couple of weeks.*” His experience is mirrored by Ethan who commented  
12 that “*It was iterative. We had no idea what we were gonna do.*” By applying the Experimentation  
13 Principle, informal volunteers can “make assumptions which are difficult to test before proceeding  
14 to action” (Brinkmann *et al.*, 2010).  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 In addition to available means, the volunteers also relied on the Pre-commitments Principle to  
25 guide their decisions and actions. They were willing to “work with any and all self-selected  
26 stakeholders” (Sarasvathy, 2008) and “coordinate some of their decisions with them” (Palmié *et*  
27 *al.*, 2018). Ethan didn’t settle on the positive impact of his donations; he also convinced his  
28 business and personal networks to commit over two thousand pounds of additional medicine and  
29 supplies. Carlos’ friends created Happy Helpertons to help with fundraising and support his  
30 efforts. Through their own initiative they became stakeholders and directly impacted Carlo’s initial  
31 idea.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37

38 The evolution of Jesse’s and Carlos’ relief efforts, from donating food and water to installing a  
39 satellite communication system and from donating lamps and batteries to supplying solar lamps  
40 and water filters are examples of the Flexibility Principle. Flexibility promotes the use of  
41 improvisation and enables creative and nonroutine responses to situations in which programmed  
42 actions are difficult (Vera and Crossan, 2005) and allows individuals to shape opportunities as  
43 information emerges (Wiltbank *et al.*, 2010). Carlos’ solutions were shaped by new information  
44 and unexpected contingencies. After arriving, he realized that his original idea was unsustainable  
45 due to transportation difficulties and with no trash pickup available, discarded batteries worsened  
46 an already ravaged natural environment. Consequently, he identified a solar lamp supplier and  
47 spent three weeks distributing them, only to pivot again to solve the potable water problem. He  
48 allied himself with an organization that produced water filters and commenced their distribution.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 A year later, his efforts pivoted again: *“I have adapted to continue helping as the situation*  
4 *changes. Now it’s education to prepare for future disasters.”*  
5  
6  
7

8 Finally, and contrary to theory, volunteers tended to disregard the Affordable Loss Principle.  
9 Volunteers believed the needs were so great and the stakes so high that risks to personal financial  
10 resources were ignored. Affordable Loss would’ve entailed efforts to minimize and control risks  
11 associated with overspending (Sarasvathy *et al.*, 2014) and potential losses (Brettel *et al.*, 2012).  
12 When given a list of direly needed medical supplies Ethan’s first thought was that *“a spending*  
13 *limit is not an option.”* He also flew to Puerto Rico, with no experience working in disaster zones,  
14 going so far as to put his personal safety at stake. Jesse, lacking government support, purchased  
15 upwards of thirty thousand dollars of equipment with his credit card.  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20

### 21 *Valparaiso Fire*

22  
23

24 Our second case covers the 2014 “Mega-fire” that ravaged nearly one thousand hectares of the  
25 Valparaiso region in Chile. The fire claimed the lives of fifteen people, injured more than five  
26 hundred and displaced approximately twelve thousand (Reszka and Fuentes, 2015). To assist,  
27 Sofia utilized a friend’s hostel (employing the Pre-commitments Principle), to set up a center of  
28 operations and receive, store and distribute supplies. Initial donations came from Sofia’s network,  
29 but later started arriving by the thousands from all over the country. Pre-commitments were also  
30 sought to help build houses, clear out debris and recruit additional volunteers. These efforts  
31 impacted day to day actions and plans, influencing the enacted opportunities. Volunteers  
32 assessed the means available: *“First step was to get people with resources, then* (emphasis  
33 *added) create a daily plan”* and acted based on what challenges they encountered: *“More than*  
34 *planning by us, it was on-the-go planning.”* – Sofia. Experimentation lead to trial and error  
35 experiments as not all actions would succeed. Sofia’s states: *“Every time we acted differently. It*  
36 *was a difficult job to accomplish as one tries to help, but not everything one does actually helps.”*  
37 Her original space transformed to a community center, a place to host activities and classes. Her  
38 duties also evolved and she became an intermediary between the community and the  
39 government, helping with paperwork and bureaucracy. Sofia also took great personal and  
40 financial risks visiting dangerous locations and exposing herself to potential landslides: *“In the*  
41 *moment I didn’t think about it, I just acted. The risk wasn’t so much as to not act.”* Needs  
42 outweighed the risks and she even downplayed them, contrary the Affordable Loss Principle.  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 Father Patricio's involvement (Alvarez, 2014; González, 2014) provides a alternative experience.  
4 After one family's home was consumed by the fire, the church opened its doors to them. This  
5 initiative grew into more than eighty families, turning the church's household into a makeshift  
6 shelter. The congregation thus falls under Whittaker's *et al.* (2015) Extended Volunteer category,  
7 expanding beyond their usual activities and their congregation members. A day after the fire, they  
8 had upwards of 340 volunteers, ready to clear debris and gather and distribute donations. Thus,  
9 they utilized their available means (the church's infrastructure and its members) to find  
10 opportunities and solutions. They applied the Flexibility Principle, expanding their activities from  
11 sheltering families to serving as a base camp and organization center. These decisions were  
12 made "*without sizing up or much less calculating what this would entail.*" – Father Patricio.  
13 Decisions were made without concern for the risks involved and negative consequences were left  
14 to be dealt with later in disregard of the Affordable Loss Principle.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22

### 23 *Chile Earthquake*

24  
25  
26 The 2010 Chile earthquake is considered the sixth largest earthquake ever recorded in history,  
27 causing the death of five hundred (Muñoz, 2010), estimated damages of thirty billion dollars  
28 (\$US), the loss of fifteen thousand jobs (Special Earthquake Report: The Earthquake Engineering  
29 Research Institute, 2010) and the destruction of more than two hundred thousand houses  
30 (Concha-Saldias *et al.*, 2015).  
31  
32  
33  
34

35 Camila's experience is of interest as she acted as an Emerging Informal Volunteer (Whittaker *et*  
36 *al.*, 2015) and later joined Volunteer Psychologists of Chile, an Extended volunteer organization.  
37 As an Emerging volunteer she visited to the town of San Antonio to bring psychological support  
38 to children. Her education and experience as a psychologist and what she found at a local  
39 supermarket influenced her daily activities (Experimentation Principle, where available means  
40 guide actions and decisions.) True to the Affordable Loss Principle, Camila first determined what  
41 she could afford to lose, based on her available resources and if her initial plan didn't work out,  
42 the loss of the invested resources was something she could handle (Sarasvathy, 2001). She later  
43 learned of another community in worse condition, so she relocated, hoping to improve their  
44 situation (Flexibility Principle).  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51

52 Her initial intervention contrast with those of her experience with Volunteer Psychologists of Chile.  
53 Their goal was to employ the capabilities and experience of psychologists to benefit those  
54 affected. Members had no prior disaster volunteer experience, placing them in the Extended  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Volunteer category. Camila was assigned to a specific geographical location, received  
4 professional training, participated in previously organized interventions, and took precautions  
5 based on evaluated risks. Camila states: *"We went in groups so as not to take risks and be safer."*;  
6 *"We visited locations that were unsafe, but not dangerous."* Although they followed a Causation  
7 approach, Effectuation principles were also applied. Daily activities were mostly funded by the  
8 volunteers, especially transportation, and there was no predetermined concept of success since  
9 their actions depended heavily on local conditions (Experimentation Principle). This suggests that  
10 Extended Volunteers combine Causation and Effectuation processes during their efforts. When  
11 applying a Causation process, the organization had previously envisioned goals, preselected  
12 locations and activities were directed at achieving their goals. However, as the situation was  
13 unpredictable and uncertain, Effectuation processes were also employed. Resources utilized  
14 were those of the volunteers themselves and actions determined upon arrival at the location  
15 (Affordable Loss and Flexibility Principles).  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 Loreto's volunteer experience with the University of Chile's Student Federation (classified under  
26 the Extended Volunteer category) mirrors that of Camila, where Causation Processes were mixed  
27 with Effectuation processes. The organization organized a trip to Batico to provide volunteers  
28 with professional psychology training sessions on how to approach emergency situations. While  
29 these actions involved preplanning, application of the Flexibility Principle was essential for it was  
30 difficult for the organization to look ahead and plan their actions. As the following quote by Loreto  
31 demonstrates: *"In the emergency, the vision was being forged in the moment, truthfully."* Despite  
32 training, volunteers needed to be flexible and plan on the go, alert to unexpected contingencies.  
33 The Experimentation Principle was disregarded, since there was some preconception of where  
34 to go and what to do and while the resources utilized were determined on the spot, the strategy  
35 was guided by a predetermined mission, and the means at their disposal.  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42

43 Lastly, Ignacio volunteered with Un Techo para Chile, an organization with many years of  
44 experience in disaster relief. Their goal was to help rebuild, erecting houses, bathrooms and  
45 classrooms and doesn't fit any category of informal volunteerism. Ignacio had no prior experience  
46 in construction and his tasks consisted of working in groups of 10 individuals that included  
47 construction experts to guide and supervise. All resources were selected and delivered by the  
48 organization, who also provided a detailed inventory of materials, manpower and building plans.  
49 We found no evidence of any of the Effectuation Principles as objectives were clearly defined,  
50 actions were planned and analyzed and all efforts and resources were directed toward achieving  
51 their predetermined goals.  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## 6. Theoretical Implications

In this study, we examined the behavior of informal volunteers and results have several implications for future theorizing and research. First, we posit that informal volunteers follow an effectual logic, an unfolding process of entrepreneurial action (Arend *et al.*, 2015). Its principles enhance our understanding of their Goals and Actions (See Figure 1), and the variables that impact their development and constant evolution. Informal volunteers rely on their Available Means (networks, knowledge and resources) to take advantage of opportunities as they are recognized or created (Sarasvathy, 2001). This explains why Ethan's immediate plan, as owner of a medical equipment company, was to transport medical supplies and why Camila, a trained psychologist, acted to bring emotional support to children. Both assessed their Available Means to guide their goals and actions. Once volunteers settle on a goal, they gain Pre-commitments from the community, NGOs or government agencies. In Sofia's case, initial donations came from her network and she continually sought Pre-commitments from others for support. Pre-commitments lead to New Means or New Goals (Andersson, 2006) and both loop back and influence future Goals and Actions. Thus, opportunities are co-created with other agents (Sarasvathy, 2001, Dew *et al.*, 2009). This feedback loop exemplifies the Experimentation Principle, where individuals are apt to abandon current actions and change course according to Available Means. In this way, Carlos started out donating batteries, transitioned to bottled water, then water filters and settled into working on community education and preparedness. Jesse started delivering food and water, transitioned to creating a satellite communication and payment system and was later developing an education and community center. Finally, through Flexibility, volunteers are open to Unexpected Contingencies. Their interventions were rarely preceded by a plan, opportunities were unknown until discovered (Ardichvili *et al.*, 2003; Kirzner, 1997) and pursued as they presented themselves. Unexpected Contingencies and improvising are welcome, with Goals evolving and frequently leading to New Solutions or entirely New Ventures to solve problems. Informal initiatives emerge organically in response to directly experienced community needs (Lewis, 2015).

Insert Figure 1 Here

Second, the Affordable Loss Principle should frame the Goals and Actions of volunteers, however, in our study, volunteers unheeded the principle as they frequently placed the needs of the people and the community before theirs. One potential explanation is provided by Martina's (2018) two-stage process model which posits that the level of investment is determined by willingness, which

1  
2  
3 is in turn influenced by loss-aversion and affect. Volunteers evaluated the value of their  
4 involvement by asking whether it would still be worth attempting in the face of certain failure  
5 (Sarasvathy, 2014). Measures of success consisted of hard to quantify psychological variables  
6 that were influenced by their emotions. A positive affect, such as passion to do good, induces  
7 goal commitment and is related to riskier investments. This opens an interesting area for further  
8 exploration to understand why and when the Affordable Loss Principle is enacted or ignored.  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13

14 Third, Effectuation Theory conveys new insights about volunteers' decisions and actions and how  
15 they contrast with those of established relief organizations. Causation processes involve clearly  
16 defined objectives that align with an organization's vision and searching for aid opportunities that  
17 meet those objectives. The organization envisions its undertaking and analyzes and plans its  
18 activities a priori, exploiting its current knowledge and resources to achieve this initial vision. The  
19 study found that application of effectuation vs causation processes depended on the informal  
20 volunteer categorization (Whittaker *et al.*, 2015). Emerging Informal Volunteers applied  
21 Effectuation Principles of Experimentation, Flexibility and Pre-Commitments while mostly ignoring  
22 the Affordable Loss Principle. Extended Volunteer Organizations applied a mix of both Causation  
23 and Effectuation processes, disregarding the Experimentation Principle but relying on the  
24 Flexibility Principle. They had a predetermined plan and didn't let their available means and  
25 resources dictate the solutions they sought, instead choosing those that would let them  
26 accomplish their predetermined mission. Due to the uncertainty and a lack of experience, they  
27 remained flexible and attempted new approaches as long as they aligned with the original plans.  
28 Traditional relief organizations on the other hand relied on Causation processes, establishing a  
29 single "best" plan from the outset (Deligianni *et al.*, 2017), and letting it guide their actions and  
30 decisions. They utilized their means to execute their plan and didn't stray far from the outlined  
31 path.  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43

44 Finally, resilience has moved from the core idea of 'resisting and recovering' into 'adapting'; and  
45 from 'stability' to 'change'. This evolution of the concept is about adaptability and opportunities for  
46 innovation and not remaining locked into specific strategies. For these opportunities to become  
47 real, learning is a key aspect, in the sense that disasters could give the opportunity for reviewing  
48 the capacity of people and organizations, based on what worked and what didn't (Aldunce *et al.*,  
49 2015). Volunteer interviews supported this view when they described established relief  
50 organizations as slow, inflexible and in some instances ineffectual, delivering solutions that were  
51 out of sync with reality. Jesse's thoughts encapsulate this view: "*Problem with NGOs: They have*  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 a preset expertise or mission. They stay in their lane, its limited what they can work on cause it's  
4 what they're set up to do and it's not always applicable." For some, solving these weaknesses  
5 was the reason they decided to become informal volunteers. Loreto acted in part to "Avoid  
6 bureaucracy and slowness." An effectual logic provides capacity for rapid deployment and pursuit  
7 of alternatives courses of action. Application of the Experimentation and Flexibility Principles allow  
8 the development of solutions that are better aligned with the needs of the community, improving  
9 the chances of success (Sanchez and Heene, 1997). Therefore, research should not associate  
10 Emerging and Extended Volunteers with a Causation approach exclusively. Future studies could  
11 employ developed instruments (Chandler *et al.*, 2011; Brettel *et al.*, 2012) to validate these  
12 findings, ascertain who applies effectual vs causal logic during disaster relief efforts and  
13 determine whether there are any added benefits to resilience building in doing so.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21

### 22 1. Practical Implications

23 Informal volunteers who work outside of the system have been traditionally viewed as a nuisance  
24 or a problem and their efforts are often undervalued or considered an intrusion (Whittaker *et al.*,  
25 2015; Helsloot and Ruitenbergh, 2004; Scanlon *et al.*, 2014; Stallings *et al.*, 1985), especially  
26 considering their disregard of the Affordable Loss Principle, which places their financial resources,  
27 or their lives, at risk. Few studies have considered issues of safety and liability (Sauer *et al.*,  
28 2014), especially if volunteers lack the necessary knowledge, skills, equipment and training  
29 (Whittaker *et al.*, 2015). Government and disaster relief organizations are thus tasked with  
30 managing and assuring their safety and well-being (Sauer *et al.*, 2014). Bureaucracy and slow  
31 response times were some of the chief reasons why volunteers circumvented established  
32 procedures, regulations and laws (Stallings *et al.*, 1985). They consequently took it up upon  
33 themselves to visit impacted areas and finance their ventures, thus placing themselves in physical  
34 and financial risk. As depicted in Figure 1, Available Means directly impact a volunteer's Goals  
35 and Actions. Providing access to affected areas, tools, information (Scanlon *et al.*, 2014), and  
36 resources that fast-track financial aid applications, reduce paperwork and speed up response  
37 times can therefore indirectly reduce financial or personal risks. In doing so, it is important that  
38 organizations support informal volunteer efforts without attempting to appropriate or co-opt the  
39 efforts and do so in non-intrusive ways (Lewis, 2015). Self-help groups can be effectively nurtured  
40 as long as they are 'left to determine their own directions and priorities' (Burns and Taylor, 1998;  
41 Wilson, 1995; Wann, 1995). Some examples are: providing access to free and safe meeting  
42 spaces, signposting them to other services that they may require and using local 'formal'  
43 volunteers as facilitators, allowing informal volunteer efforts to keep their informal nature. Finally,  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 volunteers are greatly influenced and continually searching for Pre-Commitments that lead to New  
4 Goals and New Means. Tools that aid their search for and acquisition of Pre-Commitments could  
5 be a valuable tool that can steer their efforts in the right direction and also help make their  
6 solutions sustainable.  
7  
8  
9

10  
11 Past research has demonstrated that citizen participation is a key component of disaster risk  
12 reduction and resilience building therefore “it is likely that ‘informal’ volunteers will provide much  
13 of the additional surge capacity required to respond to more frequent emergencies and disasters  
14 in the future.” (Whitaker *et al.*, 2015). There is broad consensus that stakeholder participation as  
15 opposed to expert-driven “command and control” approaches is decisive in post-disaster recovery  
16 (Wiek *et al.*, 2010). Our results validate these studies and provide additional insights as to how  
17 informal volunteers’ actions increase resilience and ameliorate recovery management problems.  
18 Through their experimentation and flexibility informal volunteers accelerate disaster recovery,  
19 recognizing opportunities (Monllor and Altay, 2016), working around bureaucracy and other  
20 roadblocks that would hinder the efforts of established organizations. Volunteers in our study also  
21 aided formal organizations, which often struggle with subsequent problems caused by deficits in  
22 recovery management (Wiek *et al.*, 2010). Informal volunteers provide a long-term orientation to  
23 recovery management, as they remained in the affected community well past the initial phases of  
24 disaster recovery or turned their relief efforts into sustainable ventures through innovative  
25 business models. They adapted from meeting immediate needs of order restoration and  
26 stabilization to rebuilding and preparedness. Informal volunteers demonstrate entrepreneurial  
27 behavior that helps jumpstart the local economy, making for stronger and more resilient  
28 communities. These findings expand current theories regarding the facilitation of post-disaster  
29 business rehabilitation environment, which are lacking, and practical experiences in post-crisis  
30 economic recovery have yet to produce well-established conceptual knowledge (Régnier *et al.*,  
31 2008). Future studies could study whether existing programs set up to encourage and support  
32 entrepreneurship can also succeed with informal volunteers.  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46

## 47 **7. Conclusion**

48  
49 The goal of this paper was to increase our understanding of the informal volunteer phenomenon  
50 and the decisions and actions that guide these volunteers through their relief efforts to speed up  
51 recovery and increase community resilience. To accomplish this, we borrowed Effectuation  
52 Theory from the entrepreneurship field in order to bring a much needed theoretical lens to the  
53 topic. Welter *et al.* (2016) encouraged fields outside entrepreneurship to explore the value of  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 effectuation in their contexts and we believe our study greatly helps informal volunteerism  
4 research move forward and past current efforts to simply define and categorize the concept. In  
5 many ways informal volunteers act just like entrepreneurs, recognizing an opportunity where  
6 others see chaos or problems and taking initiative to exploit them and create value. This opens  
7 up the possibility of a whole set of theories that can be applied to understand and promote informal  
8 volunteer behavior and have a positive impact on future disaster recovery and preparation efforts.  
9 Indeed, the measurable and ameliorative role that entrepreneurship can play in the case of  
10 disasters, along with the value it can add to such settings, is under-researched (Bullough *et al.*,  
11 2014). Disasters are destructive events that generate social distress and economic tension and  
12 the benefits of attempts to understand volunteer decision making that can increase resilience and  
13 prepare communities for future events is unquestionable.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## 8. References

- Aldunce, P., Beilin, R., Howden, M., & Handmer, J. (2015). Resilience for disaster risk management in a changing climate: Practitioners' frames and practices. *Global Environmental Change*, 30, 1-11.
- Ardichvili, A., Cardozo, R., and Ray, S. (2003). "A theory of entrepreneurial opportunity identification and development." *Journal of Business Venturing*, Vol. 18 No.1, pp. 105-123. doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(01)00068-4
- Arend, R., Saroogi, H., and Burkemper, A. (2015). "Effectuation as ineffectual? Applying the 3E theory- assessment framework to a proposed new theory of entrepreneurship". *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 630-651.
- Brettel, M., Mauer, R., Engelen, A., and Küpper, D. (2012). "Corporate effectuation: Entrepreneurial action and its impact on R&D project performance". *Journal of Business Venturing*, Vol.27 No. 2, pp. 167-184.
- Brinkmann, J., Grichnik, D., and Kapsa, D. (2010). "Should entrepreneurs plan or just storm the castle? A meta-analysis on contextual factors impacting the business planning– performance relationship in small firms." *Journal of Business Venturing*, Vol. 25 No.1, pp. 24-40.
- Burns, D. and Taylor, M. (1998) *Mutual Aid and Self-help: Coping Strategies for Excluded Communities*, Bristol: Policy Press
- Chandler, G.N., De Tienne, D.R., and Mumford, T.V. (2007). "Causation and effectuation: Measurement development and validation". *Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research*, Vol. 27 No.13, pp. 3.
- Chandler, G. N., De Tienne, D. R., McKelvie, A., and Mumford, T. V. (2011). "Causation and effectuation processes: A validation study". *Journal of business venturing*, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 375-390.
- Concha-Saldias, C., Micheletti, S., Rasse-Figueroa, A., and Olivares-Larraín, R. (2015). "Post-earthquake reconstruction in the Maule's rurality". *Bitácora Urbano Territorial*, Vol. 25 No.1, pp. 89-98.
- Corbin, J., Strauss, A.L. and Strauss, A., (2015). *Basics of qualitative research*. Sage.
- Deligianni, I., Voudouris, I., and Lioukas, S. (2017). "Do effectuation processes shape the relationship between product diversification and performance in new ventures?". *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, Vol. 41 No. 3, pp. 349-377.



- 1  
2  
3 Dew, N., Read, S., Sarasvathy, S.D., and Wiltbank, R. (2009). "Effectual versus predictive logics  
4 in entre-preneurial decision-making: Differences between experts and novices". *Journal of*  
5 *Business Venturing*, Vol. 24 No. 4, pp. 287-309.
- 6  
7  
8 Dimov, D. (2010). "Nascent entrepreneurs and venture emergence: Opportunity confidence,  
9 human capital, and early planning". *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 47 No. 6, pp.  
10 1123-1153.
- 11  
12 Farazmand, A. (2017). Crisis and Emergency management. *Crisis and Emergency Management:*  
13 *Theory and Practice.*, 1.
- 14  
15 Field, C. B., Barros, V., Stocker, T. F., and Dahe, Q. (2012), *Managing the risks of extreme events*  
16 *and disasters to advance climate change adaptation: special report of the*  
17 *intergovernmental panel on climate change*. Cambridge University Press.
- 18  
19 Fisher, G. (2012). Effectuation, causation, and bricolage: A behavioral comparison of emerging  
20 theories in entrepreneurship research. *Entrepreneurship theory and practice*, 36(5),  
21 1019-1051.
- 22  
23  
24  
25 Gibbert, M., Ruigrok, W., & Wicki, B. (2008). What passes as a rigorous case study? *Strategic*  
26 *Management Journal*, 29(13), 1465–1474. <https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.722>
- 27  
28 Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (2017). *Discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative*  
29 *research*. Routledge.
- 30  
31 Gregoire, D. A., & Cherchem, N. (2017). Looking for a way Forward: A Structured Literature  
32 Review of Effectuation Research. In *Academy of Management Proceedings*, (Vol. 2017,  
33 No. 1, p. 12907). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management.
- 34  
35  
36 Helsloot, I., and Ruitenber, A. (2004). "Citizen response to disasters: a survey of literature and  
37 some practical implications". *Journal of contingencies and crisis management*, Vol. 12 No.  
38 3, pp. 98-111.
- 39  
40  
41 Hincks, J. (2017). "The Disturbing Numbers on Puerto Rico a Month After Maria", available at:  
42 <http://time.com/4988841/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-numbers-recovery/> (accessed 24  
43 April 2019).
- 44  
45  
46 Jiang, Y., & Ruling, C. C. (2019). Opening the black box of effectuation processes: characteristics  
47 and dominant types. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 43(1), 171-202.
- 48  
49 Kirzner, I. M. (1997). "Entrepreneurial discovery and the competitive market process: An Austrian  
50 approach". *Journal of economic Literature*, Vol. 35 No. 1, pp. 60-85.
- 51  
52 Lewis, S. (2015). "Learning from communities: The local dynamics of formal and informal  
53 volunteering in Korogocho, Kenya". *IDS Bulletin*, 46(5), 69-82.
- 54  
55 Martina, R. A. (2018). Toward a theory of affordable loss. *Small Business Economics*, 1-24.
- 56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 McLennan, B., Whittaker, J., and Handmer, J. (2015). "Emergency volunteering in Australia:  
4 transforming not declining". *Australia: Bushfire and Natural Hazards CRC*.
- 5  
6 McGrath, R. G. (1995). "Advantage from adversity: learning from disappointment in internal  
7 corporate ventures". *Journal of Business Venturing*, Vol. 10 No. 2, pp. 121-142.
- 8  
9 Mechler, R. (2003). Macroeconomic impacts of natural disasters. *The World Bank*.
- 10  
11 Monllor, J., and Altay, N. (2016). "Discovering opportunities in necessity: The inverse creative  
12 destruction effect". *Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development*, Vol. 23 No. 1,  
13 pp. 274-291. doi:10.1108/jsbed-10-2014-0172
- 14  
15  
16 Monllor, J., and Murphy, P. J. (2017). "Natural disasters, entrepreneurship, and creation after  
17 destruction: a conceptual approach". *International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior &*  
18 *Research*, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 618-637.
- 19  
20 Morrish, S. C., & Jones, R. (2019). Post-disaster business recovery: An entrepreneurial marketing  
21 perspective. *Journal of Business Research*
- 22  
23 Muñoz, R. M. (2010). "Terremoto y tsunami del 27 de febrero de 2010. Efectos urbanos en  
24 localidades de la provincia de Arauco". *Urbano*, pp. 43-62.
- 25  
26 Pachauri, R. K., Allen, M. R., Barros, V. R., Broome, J., Cramer, W., Christ, R., and Dubash, N.  
27 K. (2014). *Climate change 2014: synthesis report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and*  
28 *III to the fifth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC*.  
29 pp. 151. IPCC.
- 30  
31  
32  
33 Palmié, M., Huerzeler P, Grichnik D, Keupp MM, Gassmann O., (2018) "Some principles are  
34 more equal than others: Promotion- versus prevention-focused effectuation principles and  
35 their disparate relationships with entrepreneurial orientation". *Strategic Entrepreneurship*  
36 *Journal*. pp. 1-25.
- 37  
38  
39 Patton, Michael. 2015. *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods: Integrating Theory and*  
40 *Practice*, 4th ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- 41  
42 Régnier, P., Neri, B., Scuteri, S., & Miniati, S. (2008). From emergency relief to livelihood  
43 recovery: lessons learned from post-tsunami experiences in Indonesia and India. *Disaster*  
44 *Prevention and Management: An International Journal*, 17(3), 410-430.
- 45  
46  
47 Robles, F., Davis, K., Fink, S., and Almukhtar, S. (2017, December 08). "Official Toll in Puerto  
48 Rico: 64. Actual Deaths May Be 1,052." Retrieved from  
49 [https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-death-](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-death-toll.html?pagEhanted=all)  
50 [toll.html?pagEhanted=all](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/08/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-death-toll.html?pagEhanted=all)  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 Sanchez, R., and Heene, A. (1997). "Reinventing strategic management: New theory and practice  
4 for competence-based competition. *European Management Journal*, Vol. 15 No. 3, pp.  
5 303-317.  
6  
7  
8 Sarasvathy, S. D. (2001). "Causation and effectuation: Toward a theoretical shift from economic  
9 inevitability to entrepreneurial contingency". *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 26 No.  
10 2, pp. 243-288.  
11  
12 Sarasvathy, S. D. (2008). *Effectuation: Elements of entrepreneurial expertise*. Northampton, MA:  
13 Edward Elgar Publishing.  
14  
15 Sarasvathy, S. D., Kumar, K., York, J.G., and Bhagavatula, S. (2014). "An effectual approach to  
16 international entrepreneurship: Overlaps, challenges and provocative possibilities".  
17 *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, Vol. 38 No. 1, pp. 71-93.  
18  
19 Sauer, L. M., Catlett, C., Tosatto, R., and Kirsch, T. D. (2014). "The utility of and risks associated  
20 with the use of spontaneous volunteers in disaster response: a survey". *Disaster Medicine*  
21 *and Public Health Preparedness*, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 65-69.  
22  
23 Scanlon, J., Helsloot, I., and Groenendaal, J. (2014). Putting it all together: Integrating ordinary  
24 people into emergency response.  
25  
26 Stallings, R. A., and Quarantelli, E. L. (1985). "Emergent citizen groups and emergency  
27 management." *Public administration review*, Vol. 45, pp. 93-100.  
28  
29 Strandh, V. (2019). Crisis Volunteerism is the New Black? Exploring the Diversity of Voluntary  
30 Engagement in Crisis Management. *Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy*.  
31  
32 Strandh, V., and Niklas E. (2018). "Emergent groups in disaster research: Varieties of scientific  
33 observation over time and across studies of nine natural disasters." *Journal of*  
34 *Contingencies and Crisis Management* 26, no. 3: 329-337.  
35  
36 Vera, D., and Crossan, M. (2005). "Improvisation and innovative performance in teams".  
37 *Organization Science*, Vol.16 No.3, pp. 203-224.  
38  
39 Wann, M. (1995) *Building Social Capital: Self-help in the Twenty-first Century Welfare State*,  
40 London: Institute for Public Policy Research.  
41  
42 Welter, C., Mauer, R., and Wuebker, R. J. (2016). "Bridging behavioral models and theoretical  
43 concepts: effectuation and bricolage in the opportunity creation framework". *Strategic*  
44 *Entrepreneurship Journal*, Vol,10 No. 1, pp. 5-20.  
45  
46 Weichselgartner, J. (2001). Disaster mitigation: the concept of vulnerability revisited. *Disaster*  
47 *Prevention and Management: An International Journal*.  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Whittaker, J., McLennan, B., and Handmer, J. (2015). "A review of informal volunteerism in  
4 emergencies and disasters: Definition, opportunities and challenges". *International Journal*  
5 *of Disaster Risk Reduction*, Vol. 13, pp. 358-368.

6  
7  
8 Wiek, A., Ries, R., Thabrew, L., Brundiers, K., & Wickramasinghe, A. (2010). Challenges of  
9 sustainable recovery processes in tsunami affected communities. *Disaster Prevention and*  
10 *Management: An International Journal*, 19(4), 423-437.

11  
12  
13 Wilson, J. (1995) *Two Worlds: Self-help Groups and Professionals*, Birmingham: British  
14 Association of Social Workers

15  
16 Wiltbank, R.E. and Sarasvathy, S.D. (2010). "What effectuation is not: Further development of an  
17 alternative to rational choice". *Academy of Management Conference, Montreal Canada*.

18  
19 Yin, R. K. (2013). *Case study research: Design and methods* (5th Edition). Los Angeles: SAGE  
20 Publications, Inc.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

Table 1 - Contrasting Causation and Effectuation Processes


Issue	Causal Position	Effectual Position
View of the Future	<b>Prediction.</b> Views the future as a continuation of the past that can be predicted.	<b>Creation.</b> Views the future as contingent on actions by willful agents and a residual of actions taken. Prediction is unimportant.
Basis for Commitment	<b>Should.</b> Commit as a course of maximizing, analysis, and what should be done.	<b>Can.</b> Do what you can rather than what your prediction says you should.
Basis for Taking Action and Acquiring Stakeholders	<b>Goals.</b> Let goals determine sub-goals. Commitment to particular sub-goals determined by larger goal constrained by means.	<b>Means.</b> Actions emerge from means and imagination. Stakeholder commitments and actions lead to specific sub-goals. Feedback from achievement/non-achievement of sub goals leads to design of major goals.
Planning	<b>Commitment.</b> Path selection is limited to those that support a commitment to an existing goal.	<b>Contingency.</b> Paths are chosen that allow more possible options later in the process, enabling strategy shift as necessary.
Predisposition Toward Risk	<b>Expected Return.</b> Pursue the (risk adjusted) maximum opportunity, but not focus on downside risk.	<b>Affordable Loss.</b> Don't risk more than can afford to be lost. Calculation is focused on the downside potential.
Attitude Toward Outside Firms	<b>Competition.</b> Concerned with competition and constrain task relationships with customers and suppliers to just what is necessary.	<b>Partnership.</b> Create a market jointly, building your market together with customers, suppliers and even prospective competitors.

Source: Adapted from Read and Sarasvathy (2005)

Table 2. Disaster Cases, Informal Volunteers and their Ventures

Case	Unit of Analysis			
	Volunteer	Type	Venture	Location
Hurricane Maria	Jesse	Emergent	Satellite Payment & Communications	Various, Puerto Rico
	Ethan	Emergent	Medical equipment and medicine donations	Mayagüez, Puerto Rico
	Carlos	Emergent	Donations and educational program	San Juan, Puerto Rico
Valparaiso Fire	Sofia	Emergent	Donations and Community Center	Valparaiso, Chile
	Patricio	Extended	Shelter and Volunteer Center	Valparaiso, Chile
Chile Earthquake	Camila	Emergent & Extended	Psychological Aid	San Antonio & Tapihue, Chile
	Loreto	Extended	Psychological Aid	Batuco, Chile
	Ignacio	Established	Construction	Linares, Chile

Figure 1: Informal Volunteer Effectuation Framework



1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60