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Meet-the-competition clauses and the strategic disclosure of product quality

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dc.contributor.author Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian
dc.date.accessioned 2017-11-15T20:34:29Z
dc.date.available 2017-11-15T20:34:29Z
dc.date.issued 2016
dc.identifier.citation B E Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, vol. 16, n° 4 es_CL
dc.identifier.uri http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2016-0140 es_CL
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/11447/1743
dc.description.abstract I examine the implications of meet-the-competition clauses (MCCs) for the strategic disclosure of product quality in a duopoly in which sellers can adopt these clauses before setting their prices. I show that MCCs generate incentives for the disclosure of product quality because these clauses facilitate monopoly pricing in states of nature in which the quality of products is the same. This suggests that MCCs may encourage the disclosure of information because sellers can use them to coordinate their pricing decisions based on the information revealed through disclosure. es_CL
dc.language.iso en_US es_CL
dc.subject Meet-the-competition clauses es_CL
dc.subject Disclosure es_CL
dc.subject Competition es_CL
dc.title Meet-the-competition clauses and the strategic disclosure of product quality es_CL
dc.type Artículo es_CL


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